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1Foreword
Scarcely a week goes by without a grim reminder in the media of infectious 
disease emergence or re-emergence in the United States and around the 
world. As demonstrated with the SARS outbreak in 2003, a disease threat 
in one country is a threat to all countries, and the world must have effective 
prevention and control measures.
Because global health security is considered vitally important by countries 
around the world, all 194 member states of the World Health Organization 
(WHO) signed the revised 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR). 
The IHR directs member states to collaborate with each other to detect, 
assess, and respond to public health emergencies and maintain certain core 
capacities. Experts are concerned, however, that many developing countries 
will not be able to comply with the basic obligations in the IHR by the 2012 
deadline. Such an outcome would hinder efforts to improve global public 
health security in the long term, and in the short term present an important 
security threat to the United States. 
The Global Disease Detection (GDD) program, funded by the U.S. 
Congress in 2004, protects Americans and others throughout the world from 
emerging infectious diseases by building capacity in outbreak detection and 
response in partnership with other countries and the WHO. The GDD 
program is working to close the critical gap between global public heath 
capacity defined in the IHR and the ability of many member states to meet 
these requirements. GDD unites the resources of United States and its 
international partners to provide technical assistance, logistical support, and 
funding through regional networks and intergovernmental organizations.
In 2006, the GDD program implemented a comprehensive monitoring 
and evaluation framework, which has helped to measure our progress in 
building capacity to rapidly detect and contain emerging disease threats. 
This GDD Monitoring and Evaluation Report provides a summary of 
the accomplishments of the program from 2006 to 2008 and represents 
the collective achievements of the GDD Regional Centers, other CDC 
programs, and partners.
2Global Disease Detection (GDD) 
Program
GDD is CDC’s principal and most visible program 
for developing and strengthening global capacity to 
rapidly identify and effectively respond to emerging 
infections around the world. The program comprises 
field and CDC headquarters components.
GDD Regional Centers: A central focus of GDD is 
establishing and expanding GDD Regional Centers, 
particularly in resource-constrained locations. CDC 
manages six GDD Regional Centers (see map on 
pg 3), one in each of the six WHO regions, that are 
working to develop six critical public health capaci-
ties. Each core capacity is led by a program at CDC 
headquarters.
Headquarters Scientific Expertise: CDC is one of 
the world’s leading public health agencies and the 
only U.S. government agency that can rapidly access 
in-depth expertise required to respond to complex 
disease outbreaks. GDD is connected to a vast array 
of CDC scientific experts located at CDC headquar-
ters in Atlanta and in more than 50 countries around 
the world. In addition, GDD provides tactical sup-
port through its Technical Supports Corps, a cadre of 
scientists that provide 24/7 support to GDD Regional 
Centers and can facilitate aid to the field in the case 
of prolonged or complex emergencies. Technical Sup-
port Corps members collectively possess a wide range 
of expertise in each of GDD core capacities. 
GDD Operations Center: The GDD Operations 
Center, located at CDC headquarters in Atlanta, pro-
vides early warning about international health threats 
so that CDC can respond rapidly to protect the 
health of the U.S. population and others throughout 
the world. The unit is staffed with experts in infec-
tious diseases, veterinary medicine, medical microbiol-
ogy and epidemiology; information technology; and 
an emergency coordinator that facilitates deployment 
of international teams via the CDC Emergency Op-
erations Center. The Operations Center also serves 
as CDC’s liaison with the Global Outbreak Alert 
and Response Network (GOARN), receiving and 
responding to requests for international assistance to 
control disease outbreaks.
Core Capacity at 
GDD Centers
Program Lead at CDC 
Headquarters
Emerging infectious 
disease detection 
and response
International Emerging Infections 
Program, Coordinating Center for 
Infectious Diseases
Training in field 
epidemiology and 
laboratory methods
Field Epidemiology Training 
Program, Coordinating Office of 
Global Health
Pandemic influenza 
preparedness and 
response
Influenza Division, Coordinating 
Center for Infectious Diseases
Zoonotic disease 
research and 
containment at 
the human-animal 
interface
National Center for Zoonotic, 
Vector-Borne and Enteric Diseases, 
Coordinating Center for Infectious 
Diseases
Health 
communication 
and information 
technology
Two Programs:
• National Center for Health 
Marketing, Coordinating Center 
for Health Information and 
Service
• Information Technology 
Services Office, Office of the 
Director
Laboratory systems 
and biosafety
Two Programs:
• Division of Laboratory Systems, 
Coordinating Center for 
Infectious Diseases
• Office of Health and Safety, 
Office of the Director
Global Disease Detection (GDD) Program Global Disease Detection (GDD) Program
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GDD Regional Centers
Egypt
2006
Guatemala
2006
Kenya
2004
China
2006
Thailand
2004
Kazakhstan
2008
Location of GDD Center
Approximate Operational Reach of GDD Center
(Note: dependent upon establishment of agreements with neighboring countries) 
CDC’s Global Disease Detection (GDD) Program
GDD Regional Centers
Global Disease Detection (GDD) Program
CDC has six GDD Regional Centers, one in each of the six WHO regions. Placement of Centers 
is determined by consultating with host counties, internal experts, and national and international 
partners. Criteria include the following: 
• Public health significance
• Established CDC presence
• Established regional scope
• International partner presence
4GDD Monitoring and Evaluation (M & E) Framework
GDD routinely monitors and evaluates the program’s capabilities and progress using a framework that includes 
quantitative and qualitative information related to the following five key activities: 
Outbreak Response: Improve the timeliness and reliability of outbreak investigations and responses
Pathogen Discovery: Advance public health knowledge through innovative research into the epidemiology  
and biology of emerging infections and identify novel threats before they spread
 
Training: Build capacity and improve the quality of epidemiology and laboratory science through training
Surveillance: Strengthen surveillance systems that are capable of detecting, assessing, and monitoring the  
occurrence and public health significance of infectious disease threats over time
Networking: Enhance collaboration through shared resources and synergy
GDD Regional Centers and 
Headquarters Infrastructure
GDD Global Centers and Staff 2004 2006 2008
GDD Regional Centers 2 5 6
GDD Staff Overseas 7 17 33
Locally Employed GDD  
Staff Overseas 71 263 649
GDD Staff at CDC 
Headquarters 12 25 30
Total 90 305 712
M&E data from 2006 to 2008 was captured annually.  Beginning in 
2009, M & E data will be collected on a quarterly reporting schedule.
Monitoring and Evaluation
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GDD Activity Areas 2006 2007 2008 Cumulative
O
utbreak Response
Outbreak Responses: 147 105 95 347
For which response time was within 24 hours   80 81 161 (81%)
For which GDD Lab Support was provided 14 27 39 80 (23%)
For which GDD Lab Confirmation was provided (for those that 
provided Lab Support) 6 24 33 63 (79%)
For which GDD Communications Support was provided   7 21 28 (14%)
For which epidemiological activities led to control of the outbreak   23 38 61 (31%)
That included CDC-HQ in response activities*   22 11 33 (17%)
That involved WHO or other GOARN partners*   15 12 27 (14%) 
That occurred outside of the host country* 27 22 24 73 (21%)
That achieved measurable health impact   21 36 57 (29%)
That qualified under IHR as a potential Public Health Emergency of 
International Concern (PHEIC)   10 16 26 (13%)
Pathogen 
D
iscovery
Pathogens discovered that were new to the world or region 
(cumulative) 3 14 34 34
Pathogens for which testing capacity was significantly improved 
or established for the first time (cumulative) 11 29 69 69
Training
Senior epidemiologists trained (cumulative) 26 76 160 160
Participants in short-term public health training 1,119 6,958 11,945 20,022
Surveillance
Total population under surveillance   3.5M 6.0M 6.0M
Population under pneumonia surveillance   1.8M 4.6M 4.6M
Centers with population-based pneumonia surveillance   3 5  5
Centers with population-based surveillance projects   5 6  6
Centers where surveillance data impacted policy   2 6  6
*Also contributes to “networking” activity area
Monitoring and Evaluation
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GDD Regional Centers participate in outbreak 
response activities at the invitation of the Ministry 
of Health or WHO by providing technical assis-
tance, epidemiology expertise, laboratory testing or 
consultation, and health communications support. 
In addition, GDD Centers can call upon the scien-
tific experts at CDC headquarters when additional 
assistance, such as specialized laboratory testing or 
field deployment, is needed.
Accomplishments
Collectively, from 2006 to 2008 the GDD Cen-
ters assisted with 347 outbreaks (see graph on page 
7) and other public health emergencies, including 
Rift Valley fever (Kenya – see story on page 7), the 
Sichuan earthquake (China – see story on page 7), 
cholera (Thailand), dengue hemorrhagic fever (Gua-
temala), anthrax (Kazakhstan), and human influenza 
A (H5N1) (Egypt).
Outbreak Response
GDD helps builds national and regional  
capacity to ensure that outbreak responses:
• Are Faster 
 ❍ 81% received a response within 24 
hours of the request
• Are More Comprehensive
 ❍ 23% involved lab support, and of these, 
79% led to a confirmed cause
 ❍ Communications support tripled and 
epidemiology consultations doubled in 
2008
 ❍ 17% involved CDC headquarter sup-
port
 ❍ 14% involved WHO or GOARN 
partners
 ❍ 21% were in other countries of the 
region
• Achieve Greater Health Impact 
 ❍ 29% led to saving of lives, preventive  
action, or policy change
• Prevent the Most Dangerous Threats 
 ❍ 26 qualified under IHR as a potential 
Public Health Emergency of Interna-
tional Concern, defined by WHO as an 
extraordinary public health event that:
* may have serious public health 
impact
* is unusual or unexpected
* has potential to spread  
internationally
* may restrict travel or trade
Disinfection team, Kampungu, Democratic Republican of Congo, 
Ebola Outbreak, 2007
Avian Influenza Response in 2007
Outbreak Response
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Cumulative Number of Outbreak 
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Helping contain the spread of  
Rift Valley Fever
 On June 9, 2008, a farmer in central Swa-
ziland reported abortions of cattle to the 
central veterinary laboratory in Manzini. 
A liver specimen from the aborted fetuses 
tested positive for Rift Valley Fever virus. On 
August 11, the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives in Swaziland requested as-
sistance from GDD-Kenya through Kenya’s 
Ministry of Health. A team comprised of 
medical and veterinary epidemiologists from 
the Government of Kenya, and laboratory 
experts from GDD-Kenya, including field 
epidemiology residents, provided surveil-
lance, epidemiology, and specimen collection 
assistance to Swaziland’s local and national 
agencies for two weeks. Animal quarantine 
and movement restriction interventions pre-
vented human cases. 
Mitigating Post-Earthquake  
Disease Spread
At 14:28 on May 12, 2008, an earthquake 
measuring 8.0 on the Richter scale occurred 
in Wenchuan, Sichuan Province, causing tens 
of thousands of deaths and injuries, wide-
spread building collapses, road destruction, 
power and transportation disruptions, as well 
as massive economic loss. After the earth-
quake, the China CDC immediately sent 
teams to the disaster area. The China Field 
Epidemiology Training Program responded 
to the disaster by sending 21 officers to 
provide assistance to local agencies on disease 
prevention. They conducted field investiga-
tions and raised awareness about potential 
problems with diseases, drinking water, food, 
children’s routine immunizations, treatment 
of trash and feces, among other threats. Their 
guidance aided in the organization of opti-
mal response efforts in the disaster areas and 
mitigated potential disease outbreaks.
Rift Valley Fever Outbreak, 2008
A glimpse of the destruction caused by the earthquake that struck 
Sichuan Province, China, in 2008.
Outbreak Response
8Pathogen Discovery 
GDD Regional Centers are working to identify new 
pathogens (either to the region or to the world) and 
develop testing capacity that enables more rapid  
diagnosis and confirmation of emerging health 
threats and quicker implementation of appropriate 
response interventions.
Accomplishments
• Detected 34 pathogens that were new to the 
region or the world.
• 69 pathogens can now be identified locally, up 
from 11 in 2006.
• Because this capacity had previously been limited, 
it has enhanced disease detection and identifica-
tion of appropriate response interventions. 
Helping Identify Sandfly Fever 
Sicilian Virus
In September 2007, an outbreak of febrile 
illness occurred among U.S. Army troops in a 
rural patrol base south of Baghdad, Iraq. Sol-
diers had fever, headache, malaise, and myalgia. 
A total of 14 cases were identified. Labora-
tory tests performed at the NAMRU-3/GDD 
Regional Center in Egypt indicated that 13 
of the 14 cases (92.9%) were positive for IgM 
antibodies to Sandfly fever Sicilian virus. This 
finding confirmed the presence of the virus. 
Ellis SB, Appenzeller G, Lee H, et al. Outbreak of sand-
fly fever in central Iraq, September 2007. Mil Med. 2008t; 
173(10):949-53.
Pathogen Discovery
Collecting samples for testing
Laboratorian at NAMRU-3 in Egypt
Pathogen Discovery
9Cumulative Number of New 
Pathogens Discovered and 
Testing Capacity,  2006–2008
Selected New Pathogens
Discovered, 2006–2008
GDD Center Pathogen Name New to
China Tahyna virus Region
Egypt Sandfly fever Sicilian virus Region
Egypt New cholera genotype World
Guatemala Spotted fever-Rickettsia group Region
Guatemala Human metapneumovirus Region
Kazakhstan Dengue virus Region
Kazakhstan West Nile virus Region
Kenya Lagos bat virus Region
Kenya Adenovirus A 16 subtype Region
Thailand Bartonella tamiae World
Thailand Mumps virus, genotype J Region
Pathogen Discovery
 
Discovering a Novel Bacterial Pathogen
A 38-year-old man in Northern Thailand 
sought treatment at his district hospital with 
fever that remained unexplained despite an 
extensive workup. The patient volunteered to 
enroll in a febrile illness study led by the late 
Dr. Tami Fisk and submitted blood for com-
prehensive laboratory testing. Special micro-
biologic techniques used at joint U.S. CDC/
Thailand Ministry of Public Health labora-
tories in Thailand and at CDC’s laboratories 
in Fort Collins, Colorado, led to the isolation 
of a novel bacterium. Analysis of the genome 
supported the placement of the bacterium 
within the genus Bartonella separately from 
all previously described species. This case was 
the first report of culture-confirmed Barton-
ella infection in humans in Thailand, and after 
the premature death of Dr. Fisk. the organism 
was named Bartonella tamiae. Further study 
has found that this pathogen is likely global in 
distribution.
Kosoy M, Morway C, Sheff KW, et al. Bartonella 
tamiae sp. Nov., a newly recognized pathogen iso-
lated from three human patients. J Clin Microbiol. 
2008;46(2):772-75.
Pathogen Discovery
10
Training
GDD Regional Centers strengthen in-country and 
regional public health capacity for outbreak detec-
tion and response through short-term, classroom-
based instruction and in-depth instruction and 
training of senior epidemiologists and laboratories 
through the Field Epidemiology Training Program 
(FETP). 
Accomplishments
• The number of FETP-trained senior epidemi-
ologists and laboratorians within GDD Center 
regions increased from 26 to 160 over 3 years. 
• Most of these epidemiologists serve in public 
health leadership positions within the host 
country after completion of the training pro-
gram.
• More than 20,000 persons have participated 
in short-term public health trainings, a nearly 
18-fold increase from 2006.  Instruction has 
included a combination of advanced training 
for senior public health staff, as well as intro-
ductory training to those with limited public 
health experience. 
• Short-term training topics include epidemiol-
ogy, laboratory, all-hazards preparedness, risk 
communication, influenza and others. 
Cumulative Number of Senior 
Epidemiologists, 2006–2008
Cumulative Number of Training 
Participants, 2006–2008
TrainingTraining
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Trained Field Epidemiologists in Central America
Salmonella Litchfield – Epidemiology Capacity Pays Off
From January to April 2008, 51 persons in 17 U.S. states were infected with Salmonella Litchfield 
and at least 16 persons were hospitalized.1 Interviews comparing foods eaten by ill and well per-
sons showed that cantaloupe from Honduras was the likely source of the illnesses. An epidemi-
ologist from GDD-Guatemala participated in the FDA-led team that investigated a Honduran 
exporting firm whose cantaloupe was associated with the outbreak. In the meantime, a graduate of 
the Field Epidemiology Training Program carried out an investigation for the Honduras Ministry 
of Health to determine if there were any cases in Honduras. GDD-Guatemala had discussions 
with the Honduras Ministry of Health regarding the outbreak and strengthening national food-
borne disease surveillance. Continued capacity building and coordination of epidemiologic exper-
tise in the United States and Central America can enhance the ability to prevent such outbreaks 
or contain them more quickly in the future.
1. Investigation Update: Outbreak of Salmonella Litchfield Infections, 2008, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,. 
Available at http://www.cdc.gov/Salmonella/litchfield/.
TrainingTraining
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Surveillance
GDD Regional Centers follow a stepwise approach to developing sophisticated surveillance capacity.  One ap-
proach (see figure below) begins with population-based surveillance, including an accurate case definition and 
then laboratory testing. The objective is to accurately define disease burden to influence public health policy, 
which leads to decreased morbidity and mortality.  
Image of a graph which illustrates the stepwise approach to 
developing surveillance. The steps begin with establish pop-
ulation-based surveillance, add simple laboratory diagnostics, 
ad more complex testing, influence health policy and protect 
Surveillance Surveillance
health.
An example of the stepwise approach in practice is described on page 13. 
Accomplishments
• 4.6 million persons are under population-based surveillance for pneumonia in 5 GDD regions.
• 1.4 million persons are under population-based surveillance for other syndromes in 4 GDD regions.
• GDD Regional Centers are using surveillance data to detect outbreaks, make policy recommendations, 
evaluate new interventions, and measure public health effect. 
• Household surveys of health utilization have informed development of surveillance methods suitable 
for each
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Years
Protect Health
Influence Health Policy
Add More Complex Testing
Add Simple Laboratory Diagnostics
Establish Population-Based Surveillance
A Stepwise Approach to Surveillance: One Model
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Surveillance Surveillance
Building Stepwise Surveillance in Thailand to Protect Against Influenza 
In 2003, Thailand’s Ministry of Public Health and CDC’s International Emerging Infections Pro-
gram established population-based pneumonia surveillance in Thailand.1 One year later, nasopharyn-
geal swabs were collected and laboratory diagnostics were conducted to identify viral causes, includ-
ing influenza. More complex testing was added later. Surveillance data were used to publish findings 
on incidence, cost, risk factors, and seasonality of influenza since 2003.2,3 Evidence of increased 
morbidity and mortality among seniors influenced the government to make a policy decision to 
invest in influenza vaccine for seniors. In 2008, the government doubled the number of vaccinations 
provided to about 600,000. In addition, a new government vaccine plant will be operational by 2011, 
eventually producing more than 10 million doses annually.4 This increased production will enable the 
country to vaccinate nearly one-sixth of its population, protecting them from an annual health threat 
that 10 years earlier was not  a concern in Thailand.
1. Olsen SJ, Laosiritaworn Y, Siasiriwattana S, Chunsuttiwat S, Dowell SF. The incidence of pneumonia in rural Thai-
land. Int J Infect Dis. 2006;10(6):439-45.
2. Simmerman JM, Lertiendumrong J, Dowell SF, et al. The cost of influenza in Thailand. Vaccine. 2006;24(20):4417-26.
3. Katz MA, Tharmaphornpilas P, Chantra S, et al. Who gets hospitalized for influenza pneumonia in Thailand? Implica-
tions for vaccine policy. Vaccine. 2007;25(19):3827-33.
4. Thailand Commits to Seasonal Flu Shots for Seniors. CDC Global Health E-Brief. 2008;2. Available at http://www.
cdc.gov/washington/EGlobalHealthEditions/eGlobalHealth0708.htm.
Going beyond clinical diagnosis: A nasopharyngeal swab for the Respiratory 
Pathogen Study, Thailand
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Networking
The GDD Operations Center relies on a vast network of people to identify and confirm disease events. This 
network includes CDC subject matter experts in the United States, their international networks, CDC inter-
national staff based in more than 50 countries, and WHO staff in more than 140 countries. It also includes 
members of the Biosurveillance Indications and Warning Analytic Community (BIWAC), a USG interagency 
collaboration that allows 10 agencies to exchange unclassified information via a secure Web-based portal. 
To facilitate rapid response, the GDD Operations Center has an outbreak fund to support travel, supplies, and 
shipping. The Operations Center also coordinates efforts with GDD Regional Centers and their network of 
governmental, nongovernmental, and private partners. The Operations Center facilitated and funded (approxi-
mately $2 million) more than 20 significant responses to diseases such as avian influenza, cholera, Ebola (see 
story on page 15), Marburg, and Rift Valley fever during 2006–2008.
Networking
The GDD Operations Center, located in CDC’s Emergency Operations Center (shown above), 
provides early warning about and rapid response to international health threats.
Networking
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Coordinating a Response to Unexplained Deaths in Democratic Republic of Congo
On August 27, 2007, the GDD Operations Center picked up a media report and began to closely track 
news of unexplained deaths in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Early reports identified 
symptoms associated with a range of diseases, including typhoid, dysentery, gastrointestinal anthrax, 
and hemorrhagic fever. Initial detection of the disease was made more difficult because the remote vil-
lage in which the cases were first identified had no health clinic.
 
CDC began exchanging information with WHO, and the local WHO office supported a field investi-
gation by the Ministry of Health. The CDC office in DRC collaborated closely with the ministry and 
offered technical assistance when it was apparent that the outbreak posed a significant health threat.
GDD Operations Center staff worked quickly to collect and analyze (with support from CDC tech-
nical staff,) the data and sampling results, including WHO field reports. Staff set up conference calls 
to discuss possible causes including one with the medical director of the remote hospital where case-
patients were going for treatment. These discussion strengthened the suspicion that the outbreak was 
being caused by a hemorrhagic fever. As a result of this discussion and other available data, the GDD 
Operations Center deployed Dr. Peter Kilmarx, a CDC physician who had previously worked in the 
area, to work with the Ministry of Health to conduct a field epidemiological and logistics assessment 
that would guide a larger response if required. After specimen tests were performed at CDC and a 
laboratory in Franceville, Gabon, the causative agent was confirmed as Ebola. CDC laboratories in At-
lanta also determined that a large outbreak of typhoid was concurrently affecting the same population, 
and this outbreak had contributed to the difficulty in initially establishing a diagnosis. 
CDC then coordinated the deployment of a team of nine scientists from its Special Pathogens Branch 
to assist in the field response. Over the next 6 weeks, the outbreak was controlled and eventually ended 
through the efforts of the DRC Institut National de Recherche Biomédicale, WHO, CDC, and other 
partners in the Global Outbreak and Alert Response Network (GOARN), including the nongovern-
mental organizations Doctors Without Borders and EpiCentre, as well as the Public Health Agency of 
Canada.
Networking Networking
Since the 1970’s, newly emerging diseases 
have been identified at the unprecedented rate 
of one or more per year . . .
It would be extremely naïve and complacent to 
assume that there will not be another disease 
like AIDS, another Ebola, or another SARS, 
sooner or later.
—The World Health Report 2007. A Safer Future: Global Public Health Security in the 21st Century
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